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A RESPONSE TO MAXINE GREENE'S'COGNITION AND CONSCIOGSNESS: 
THE HUMANITIES AND THE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL TEACHER '  
by 
George C. Simmons 
My remarks will be confined to the latter part of the title of Professor 
Greene's paper,' The Humanities and the Elementary School Teacher� I am 
aware that the colon is used to signify antithesis or illustration, or as Fowler 
says, "that of delivering the goods that have been invoiced in the preceding 
words."1 If the title were laid out in strict grammatical form, one could of 
course insist that since I understood the apodosis, I should have understood the 
protasis. But I make no claim to be able to speak with any confidence on 
"cognition and consciousness," even though I do cognize and am conscious; I do 
make a claim to having some concern for the humanities and to have been 
initiated into the academic world through the !humanities, specifically through 
one of the classical languages and literature. My references, therefore, will be 
quite different from those of Professor Greene, but our views a.re somewhat, 
though not entirely, compatible. 
Professor Greene proposed to speak "with self-awareness, clarity, and sym­
pathy" and, in my judgment, accomplished two of these goals with conspicuous 
success. With clarity, indeed with perspicacity, she has spoken. Compassion and 
sympathy abound in her paper and her sympathy for teachers puts the 
Athenians to shame for, as you might be aware, when one dropped out of cir­
culation in ancient Athens, il was said of him that either he had died or had 
become ho grammatistes, an ele91entary school teacher. 
Sympathy has always been in short supply, with its opposites flooding the 
market, and elementary school teachers have too often been looked upon as 
"personnel defined by a professional specialty." Endorsing this spirit of sym­
pathy, I am reminded of the words of Sarpedon to Glaucus in the !Iliad: 
"hiomen", he said, meaning, "let us go forward," or, as some might say, 
"right on!" 
The third characterization of the paper, that of "self-awareness" poses a 
problem for me. That term, like the term "self-consciousness," or the sentence 
"I exist," or the phrase "persons becoming conscious of themselves," resides in a 
cloudy and indeterminate realm. It is at best imprecise, or as A. J. Ayer says, 
"peculiar and degenerate. "2 
Statements such as "I exist," "I am conscious" do not express genuine pro­
positions. U can indeed be asked, what ts the term "self-consciousness"de­
scribing; Ayer claims that the term describes nothing and "is merely an ex­
pression of the tautology that if a description is complete there is nothing left to 
be described."3 Surely it is the case that if one claims to be conscious one is 
bQund to be right; but this does not mean that one is in some particular state of 
mind which confers infallibility upon one. It is the case, as Ayer has said, "that 
if he is in any conscious state whatever, he must be conscious,"4 and if he is 
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conscious he must be conscious of himself. 
I will raise one further question about this phrase "becoming conscious of 
oneself" and then I shall let the matter rest. Is the "self" different from the 
"one," or is the self the ghost in the one? I am sure that Professor Greene can 
clarify these points for us. 
Professor Greene eloquently describes the tasks of the teacher as that of 
"teaching skills to the young, moulding them, guiding them, and trying to set 
them free. . . " I do not want to be captious, but I think that it would be an 
error on the part of the teacher to perc�ive of herself/himself as being engaged in 
a work of "moulding," and a fortiori, it would be an error for us to construe of 
the work of the teacher in that light. 
The metaphor, of course, was created for us by Plato, and Western thought 
is so dominated by Plato that even Profes.sor Greene falls prey to the Master. 
Says A. E. Taylor in Platonism and Its Influence, Plato's influence is so pervasive 
that, "like the pressure of the atmosphere (it) goes undetected pecause we 
never reaUy get free from it. "5 
To return to the Platonic metaphor: In Book II of the Republic, Socrates 
says, "Do you not know, then, that the beginning in every task is the chief 
thing . . .  ? For it is then that it is best moulded and takes the impression that one 
wishes to stamp upon it," ("malista gar de t;ote plattetai kai eudueta tupos")6 
"And the stories on the accepted list we will induce nurses and mothers to tell to 
the children and so shape their souls (plattein tas psukas) . . .  far rather than 
their bodies by their hands."7 
If Prof es.sor Greene errs on this score she does so in good company; in Plato's 
and Aristotle's and more reeently in Professor Ashley Montagu's. "Those who 
teach the young,'' wrote Montagu, "are at once the most important and the most 
privileged of all those agencies . . .  of society . . .  ; for what can exceed in social 
importance the task of moulding the mind and helping to form the character of 
the growing member of society?"B 
Vessels cahhot resist, cannot talk back, have ho potential, no intellect; with 
children it is quite otherwise. Teaching is defined by Scheffler as "an activity 
aimed at the achieving of learning, and practiced in such a manner as to respect 
the student's intellectual integrity and capacity for independent judgment. "9 
The metapho1 provided by Plato and concurred in by Professor Greene fails 
the requirements of this acid test. 
The "contemporary" question "Who am I?" does not seem to me to be in­
consistent with the "ancient" question "What is man?" If "I" is part of the 
generic "Man" then any discovery about "I" would be an elucidation of some 
aspect of "Man." To use the Socratic analogy, "Man" is but the "I" writ large. 
But to insist that the question "Who am I?" is "modem" is to ignore the entire 
preoccupation of Socrates whose constant and annoying theme was, "Man know 
thyself." Socrates was really inviting his fellow Athenians to come to a full 
understanding (episteme) of their limitations and thus undertake such tasks as 
they could reason�bly perform. The Protagorean homo-mensura tenet (man is 
the measure of all things) was also a call for self expression and was, as Gomperz 
says, "a contribution to the theory of cognition."10 
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I am in full agreement with the construction placed on the humanities and 
particularly with their identification with the liberal arts! I had taken it for 
granted, however, that historical studies and philosophy were the warp and woof 
of liberal studies and am a bit surprised that Professor Greene "would also in­
clude" these subjects, as if they did not belong there in their own right. Philos­
ophy is not an embellishment to the humanities, nor is it the sort of thing one 
"does" when one is "moved." 
One cannot wipe out the Platonic tradition nor rid oneself of the Platonic 
ghost in a single sentence. Philosophical questions are philosophical questions, 
whether they were formulated in the Academy, in the Lyceum, in Vienna, or in 
Cambridge. I agree with Bernard Bosanquet that 
a philosophical treatment is the study 6f something as a whole and for its 
own sake. In a certain sense it may be compared to the gaze of a child or of 
an artist. Tt deals, that is, with the total and unbroken effect of iLs object. 
It desires to ascertain what a thing is, what is its full characteristic and being, 
its achievement in the general act of the world. History, explanation, analysis 
into cause and conditions, have value for it only in so far as they contribute 
to the intelligent estimation of the fullest nature and capabilities of the real 
individual whole which is under investigation. We all know that a flower is 
one thing for the geometrician, another for the chemist, another for the 
botanist, and another, again, for the artist. Now, philosophy can of course 
make no pretension to cope with any one of the specialists on his own ground 
BuL the general nature of the task imposed upon it is this: aiding itself, so far 
as possible, by the trained vision of all specialists, to make some attempt to 
see the full significance of the flower as a word or letter in the great book of 
the world. And this we call studfing it, as it is, and for its own sake, without 
reservation or presupposition.1 1 
I concur with the view, albeit reluctantly, that "an education in the human­
ities will (not) guarantee decency or commitment on the part of any individual." 
Professor Greene's comment on the German schools is apt. For centuries people 
have gone to the literature of Greece and Rome for an education in values, for a 
conception of the civilized man, to learn how to live and what to live for, and 
in what manner to die. Some have, therefore, pointed out that for centuries the 
best poets (Shakespeare the greatest of them alone excepted); the greatest 
statesmen (Churchill the greatest among them alone excepted); the most mag­
nanimous men who adorn the pages of history were all educated in the classics. 
Ergo, the classics have produced great men. But one must also consider the 
fact that incompetent and corrupt politicians were also educated in the classics. 
And in our own day Enoch Powell, a bigot and racist par excellence, got a first 
in the literae humaniores. Ergo, the classics are demonstrably harmful. In either 
case, the argument mi�es the point. 
Finley states: 
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It was not the classics which were providing the values so much as it was the 
values which were choosing the classics. Too often they still do. One point in 
Livingstone's Defence was that the classics introduce us to modem problems; 
they teem with modern character, situations, problems. The reader's con­
fidence is quickly shaken when he is told on the next page that the difference 
between our industrial classes and the Greek slave is spiritual rather than 
material · and a few pages further that Aristotle had stated, more than two 
thousand years ago, the fundamental practical objections to socialist theories 
and revolutionary schemes.12 
I very much wish to endorse Professor Greene's eloquent claim for the 
humanities "that informed participation in the humanities can make it possible 
for individuals to recover a true vision of their lives." Bui the language is so 
poetic and mystical that I must seek clarifkation. Could· it be that Socrates' 
ghost is imposing on her the doctrine of reincarnation? 
Reflection, I agree, involves "anguish," a bewilderment, a certain puzzling 
about possibilities; and the humanities, particularly philosophy, can help sort 
out reasonable choices. But Plato anticipated even Dewey in this view. In Book 
VII of the Republic, Socrates states "Is it not the case where the soul must be 
at a. loss (psuken apoorein) as to what significance for it the sensation of hard· 
ness has?" Plato is arguing that thought is provoked by contradictions in per­
ceptions. The very notion of unity contradicts the notion of uninterrupted 
unity. We will recall Dewey's words in How We Think: "We may recapitulate by 
saying that the origin of thinking is some perplexity, confusion, or doubt. "1 4 · 
Professor Greene seems to reject the Idealist's view with its "assumptions of 
good and right [for it] never solved the problem of whether the ability to know 
or intuit or 'see' the good ensured right action . . .  " And yet in the same breath 
Professor Greene would "impose order on a shapeless, unjust world:" Who 
must impose, and whose conception of order is to be imposed? Surely, if order 
and shape are to be imposed there must be a unifying, regulating mind and an 
idea (eidos) of what order and form are. I find her views very consonant with 
Plato's. 
But there is something even more disquieting to me, and it is the glib manner 
in which Socrates is dismissed on a point. I assume that Professor Greene has 
reference to two Socratic paradoxes: 
1. All wrong doing is involuntary. 
2. One cannot know right and do wrong. 
First, we must understand that it was a standing tenet in Greek ethics that 
one who knew "the good" would aim at doing good. Plato puts it thus: "The 
man who does wrong on purpose, if there is such a person, is the good man." 
The insinuation is clear: no such man can be found. We must remember the 
Socratic doctrine that virtue is knowledge and the Socratic dictum given by 
Plato in the Laws that "all wrong doing is involuntary." Plato's use of the word 
ekousin (voluntary) means "regularly what we really wish to have. "1 5  No one 
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wishes to have what he knows is bad for him. This does not mean that men do 
not wish for thal which is bad for them, but they do so mistakenly: they mis­
take the bad for the good. To wish for a thing because you know it is bad for 
you is clearly absurd. And we all will agree with Aristotle, I am sure, that 
"everyone wishes for what he thinks is good." 
Thus it seems to me that the proposition "all wrong doing is involuntary" 
has nothing to do with freedom; it simply states negatively the positive pro­
position that a man who knows what the highest good is, whether by intellect 
(nous) or by intuition (diaeslhesis), will always act on his knowledge. 
ORIOINS OF THE HUMANITIES 
Man, says Aristotle, is a political animal. "It is clear that the city state is a 
natural growth (phaeron oti ton phusei) and t.hal man is by nature a political 
animal (politikon zoon ) . "l.6 "It is clear therefore that the state is also prior by 
nature to the individual" (kai phusei proteron he ekastos). 
Since the state is a product of the human mind no one could expect 
Aristotle to argue that the state existed in point of time prior to the individual. 
What Aristotle meant is: 1 7 
1. The state is an evolution which is necessary and sufficient for man's 
potential. 
2. There is a certain principle underlying the life of the homo sapiens which 
will not allow the potential to be actualized unless the full sphere or arena 
which is constituted by the life of the state is constituted in fact. 
Such a state resulted from certain,social, intellectual and cultural habits and 
it can be maintained only as these habits are nurtured. It seems to me that the 
development of this conception of man as a creature capable of education, 
fallible and mortal, susceptible to civilization, "something intermediate between 
God and the other animals," represents a colossal stride for the human kind. 
And it was the Greeks who first articulated these human characteristics 
(anthropinos), who first conceived of the good life in terms of an educational 
ideal. The political state and the sludy of humanities are linked in Greek 
history. 
The historical development has been well sketched for us in Professor 
Greene's paper. But let me, for my own purpose, spell them out more precisely. 
As early as the time of Solon (born circa 639 B.C.) there was a distinction 
between gymnastike, the training of the body, and mousike, the training of the 
soul. Out of the mousike there evolved the body of studies which was late.r 
known as the liberal arts. By the time of Aristotle the Greek conception of 
education had reached its acme and his words may be taken as a true represen­
tation of the Greek ideal of man and of education. 
In the Politics he defines the liberal arts (eleutherion epistemon) as the proper 
study of free men who seek moral and intellectual excellence in general rather 
than that which is immediately useful. Thus we have the beginning of the 
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distinction between liberal (eleutheron) and technical (aneleutheron) education, 
the foreshadowing of the identification of the liberal arts with general culture, 
and the invidious contrasting of general and specialized education. It should be 
pointed out that the word (e/eutheron) is derived from the verb (eleutheroo)= 
to be set free, to release, to free from blame, to acquit. 
While it is true that no specific number of subjects are found among the 
Greek writers on education, it is very certain that grammar was first on the 
list, fol1owed by rhetoric and dialectics (logic). Arithmetic, geometry, music, 
and astronomy came later. Still later medicine and architecture were listed as 
liberal subjects and of course philosophy became for Plato the coping stone of 
the curriculum. 
These subjects were passed on to the Romans after Rome conquered Greece 
with her arms and as Horace complained, "Greece took her Roman conqueror 
captive and introduced art into the rustic Latium," Graecia capla ferum uictorem 
cepit, et artes. At any rate the staples of the education of the Roman gentleman 
(liber homo), by whatever name they were called-artes liberales, studium 
liberalia, liberales disciplires, or liberates scientae-were fixed. 
By the time of Seneca and Quintilian, that is, by the end of the first century 
of the Christian era, the liberal arts had become a clearly distinguishable body of 
instruction, known as (encyclios paideia), a rounded or encyclical education. 
The promulgation of Christianity as the official religion of the Empire 
ushered in a new era for the humanities. The Western church early exhibited 
strong antagonism against the pagan learning; then there was a period of guarded 
toleration, and finally an embracement by the church of the liberal arts. The 
conflicts between the simple spirit of Christianity and the arrogance of pagan 
learning is poignantly portrayed in the writings of St. Augustine and St. 
Jerome.18 St. Augustine advocated "spoiling the Egyptian," by which he meant 
using the powerful intellectual resources of the arts to the advantage of the 
Gospel. The marriage between the arts and the Church was consummated by 
Martianus Capella's De Nuplus Philologiae et Murcurii. 
Even though the universities of Western Europe "arose'' outside the authority 
of the church, they soon fell under the church's influence, thus ensuring the 
standardization of the curriculum. Oxford was an offshoot of Paris, as Cam­
bridge was of Oxford, and as Harvard was of Cambridge. Thus by a series of 
successions the curriculum of the American university can be linked to human­
istic learning as developed by the Greeks and modified through the centuries. 
What has all of this to do with the relationship between the humanities and 
the education of elementary school teachers? The education of elementary 
school teachers. had a very inauspicious beginning in Western Europe, as in 
America, and has never really acquired a locus standi in the university. All of us 
here are too familiar with that story, hence I need not recount it. 
Within the last twenty years, beginning with Bestor's Educational Wasteland, 
(1953) a very considerable literature, mostly critical, has appeared on the subject 
of teacher education. Most of these writers have been aliens to the field of 
"professional education," and many have examined the relationship between 
the liberal arts and the education of teachers. 
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That this kind of trenchant examination of the education of teachers has not 
been carried out by the professional educators is perhaps symptomatic of the 
state of the intellectual calibre, or lack of it, of professional educators. Arrow­
smith states, and I agree with him, "Teachers have far too long been recruited 
from the ranks of the not.too-bright, and then stultified by their education,"19 
at the hands of the not-too·bright professors of education. There is some evi­
dence to support this view that teachers generally are below average liberal 
arts graduates in intelligence. Some time ago a group of liberal arts graduates at 
Cornell, not one of whom was exposed to a professional education course, took 
the National Teacher Examination. Their average score was higher than the 
average score of graduates of teacher colleges.20 Of course, it might also .support 
the view that students "pick up" a great deal about education during their 
college life and "professional education" might be a big joke! 
The relationship between the liberal arts and teacher education was subjected 
to detailed investigation at the "Year of the Liberal Arts" conference heid in 
Phoenix, Arizona, during the spring of 1970. The results of the conference were 
published in a book, ominously titled, The Liberal Arts and Teacher Education, 
a Confrontation. Anyone who is interested in the education of teachers should 
read the book. Three of these essays are, I think, of particular significance to our 
concerns: Timothy Healy's "The Liberal Arts, Open Admissions and the Training 
of Teachers";  B. Othanel Smith's, "The Liberal Arts and Teacher Education"; 
and William Arrowsmith's, "The Future of Teaching." 
Professor Smith summarizes his views thus: 
Unless there is a program of teacher preparation in the liberal arts appro· 
priate to the work in humanities in the schools, it will be difficult, if not 
impossible, to find appropriate personnel to man the public school program. 
This will require, among other things, that in the universities and colleges we 
abandon the policy of "liberal arts as usual." Instead it will be necessary to 
develop a pro�ram for the preparation of teachers in the liberal arts through 
the cooperation of the same mix of personnel � recommended for the 
development of the public school program. In any event, a program in 
liberal arts must come to grips with man's problems and experiences, his 
purpose and his hopes, his conditions and his destiny, in and through a con­
tent representative of the intellectual tradition and also of the various media 
of communication. It must also provide for an intellectual discipline that is 
not purely literary and subjective.21 
It is well to bear in mind that the liberal arts are neither a place, a college 
department, nor even a college. They are a depository of a certain kind of 
knowledge, and any program of education that has need of such knowledge 
can and should appropriate it. This does not mean that liberal arts education 
should be the business of everyone. If it is to be well done, it must be carried 
on by a group of devoted scholars. But neither does it mean that such a body 
has a monopoly on the territory of the liberal arts.22 
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Professor Arrowsmith is in substantial agreement with Smith: A liberal 
education 
. . .  liberates because it sets us free to become ourselves, to realize ourselves; 
it frees us to learn, slowly and painfully perhaps, our limitations and our 
powers, and to recognize our real modalities, undeafened by the over­
whelming Muzak of the social and political enterprise. Liberally educated, 
we are free to become political at last, without risk of being captured and 
possessed by our politics. And this freedom, this ripeness of self, is the indis­
pensable element in all true teaching, simply because it speaks so compellingly 
to those who hunger to be free-that is, presumably, to all men. 2 3 
Men are educable in direct proportion to their conviction of being imperfect, 
unfinished, base, unrealized; gods need neither education nor degrees. The 
teacher educates by being the man he is, by the power and beauty of his 
knowledge, as that knowledge is expressed in his conduct or being or under­
standing. He has no other authority. And the intrusion of any extraneous 
authority is a profanation of education. Men want education because they 
want to perfect their humanity. The creati.on of  a joint humanity, the collab­
oration of teacher and student in the making of a self, is the aim of the 
enterprise.24 
This is strikingly reminiscent of the Socratic dialectic which required that one 
be contradicted and made to feel uncomfortable before "delivering" a good 
idea. Says Socrates, no one can truly be said to be educated until he is contra­
dicted, even though he be the King of Persia. 
Formal education, I am convinced, cannot improve, cannot set us free, until 
we recognize-and act on our recognition-that the liberal arts and teacher 
education are one and the same thing. Only when the liberal arts colleges 
renounce their servile professionalism and devote themselves seriously-that 
is, with all their resources-to the education of teachers, will public education 
ever become the instrument of a great human and democratic culture.2!"> 
Timothy Healy sees. one of two possibilities for the future of teacher 
education: 
1. A return to the t·eacher education college, with a revival of the normal 
school. 
2. A scrapping of teacher education as we now know it and a fresh 
beginning. 2 6 
His view was that the latter would prevail. 
Near the end of the essay Healy made this almost prophetic remark: "It might 
remain a possibility, at least in a speculative world, that the principle thrust of 
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our teacher-training institutions ought not to be to train new teachers but to 
retrain old ones. The schools could conceivably do a much better job of 
handling the novices. 2 7 
I sense a crisis in the area of teacher education, certainly here at Brockport. 
There has been a failure somewhere along the way. It could be that the liberal 
arts faculty by assuming a superior stance, or by its preoccupation with what 
Arrowsmith calls "useless research and pseudo-scholarship" is driving teacher 
education from the center of intellectual activity. What seems to be the fad is 
the emerging, recreated Normal School, euphemistically called "competency 
based certification." 
Conant urged ten years ago that the liberal arts faculty aS5ume the responsi­
bility for the education of teachers; but the colleges and universities absconded 
and by default there has arisen this recent anti-intellectual, anti-humanistic, ill­
directed movement which threatens to replace the process of education with an 
illiberal, performance based system. With a plethora of pedagogic verbiage, and a 
paucity of sound philosophic humanistic thinking, this new fad moves forward, 
apparently unchecked. And those who demand from the exponents some sort of 
rationale are dubbed "humbugs." They want to "get on" with the job! 
But those of us who have a sense of history can only be comfort.ed by the 
fact that experience has shown that a purely, mechanically based operation, 
devoid of theory and a philosophical base, soon manifests its own inadequacies 
and degenerates into perfunctory and repetitious acts. 
It is the duty of those of us who are aware of this danger to call the signals. 
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